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Rating agencies, by the assigned risk 
grades, point out the quality of debtors and 
credit instruments in terms of the probability 
to cease payments and the recovery possi-
bilities. The existence and development of 
rating agencies on the capital markets is 
generally explained by the capacity they 
have to facilitate transparency and efficiency 
of markets, by reducing the informational 
asymmetry between the issuers and 
investors. It is acknowledged by the profes-
sional literature that rating agencies dimi-
nish the problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. This paper is another theo-
retical manner of approach, trying to prove 
that one of the main explanations of the 
rating agencies existence is the fact that 
these organizations allow the economy of 
the transaction costs. The first part of the ar-
ticle briefly describes the concepts of tran-
saction and transaction costs. Also, this part 
presents a synthetic image of the role of 
rating agencies on the capital market. The second part makes an 
analysis of the transaction with rating, as a contractual transaction 
and, at the same time, a producer of externalities. The paper ex-
plains why the transactions with rating can be considered hybrid 
mechanisms of governance generating externalities upon the ex-
changes on the financial markets, allowing the creation of new hy-
brid organizational structures on these markets. Moreover an at-
tempt has been made to list the main categories of transaction 
costs saved due to the rating agencies requirements. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than a century the rating agencies have been 
giving opinions regarding the solvability of the issuers of 
bonds and their financial liabilities. Extension of rating 
has been facilitated by the presentation manner of the 
risk grade: an alphabetic or alphanumeric symbol easily 
interpreted by the actors of the financial market, given 
that there is a well defined evaluation scale. Thus, all the 
rating agencies evaluate risk on a scale with two main 
categories: investment grade and speculative grade. Risk 
is irregularly rising, starting from class A, towards classes 
C or D, dependent on the lettering typical to each rating 
agency. This apparently simple symbol encompasses 
information whose limit and accuracy are doubtful, 
according to many empirical studies, many of them being 
done by the rating agencies themselves. Rating content, 
difficult to be defined, (understood as a transactional good 
on the rating market) and its concentrated structure of 
tight oligopoly of this industry have made the activity of 
rating agencies a controversial one in many aspects, such 
as the transparency of the lettering process, the potential 
interest conflicts generated mostly by issuer-pay model, 
and also by subscriber-pay model and by consulting 
services given by the agencies, rating accuracy and 
performance and their diminished value in comparison 
with the high market value. The last financial crisis has 
emphasized once more the failure of the rating agencies 
to timely and correctly signals the credit quality and the 
necessity to rebuild the institutional framework where they 
function. Beyond the polemic concerning the rating 
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agencies conduct and the accuracy and performance of 
ratings, the financial market continues to react to signals 
defined by risk grades. Rating agencies’ mistakes have led 
to the modification of their regulating framework both in 
EU, and outside it, including in the USA, but they have not 
lost the reputation of agencies enough to endanger their 
existence. It seems to be incomplete the reason of rating 
suppliers existence in terms of the principal-agent issue, 
of their capacity to signal and monitor the quality of debt 
instruments. The objective of this paper is to study the 
hypothesis in accordance to which one of the main 
explanations regarding the existence of rating agencies 
states that these organizations allow the economy of the 
transaction costs. The methodology used to achieve this 
objective is the deductive one, based on existing works 
and theories, briefly presented in the beginning of this 
paper, and on empirical evidence.  
The paper is organized in the following manner: the 
second part gives the definition of transaction, explains 
the transaction costs and the role of rating agencies on 
the capital market. The third part offers a non-exhaustive 
answer to the question: which are the categories of 
transaction costs diminished or eliminated through the 
functioning of rating agencies? The main conclusions to 
the article are: (i) rating agencies are mainly associated 
with the transactions generating externalities (ii) rating 
activity has generated a new hybrid form of governing the 
financial transactions, i.e. a contract between the financial 
investor and debtor mediated by the rating agency (iii) 
saving the transaction costs is a very important 
determiner of rating agencies’ existence, development 
and survival. 
2. THEORETICAL REFERENCES  
AND CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES 
2.1. Transactions and Transaction Costs 
The term of transaction is not uniformly defined within the 
economy of transaction costs. Thus, Coase (1988) does 
not precisely approach the concept of transaction, but he 
often associates transaction costs with trade of goods on 
the free market. In this context, transaction can be 
understood as a transfer of property rights towards certain 
assets between independent entities. A complex vision on 
transaction can be found to Commons (1934): “sale and 
procurement between individuals of rights on future 
properties on physical objects”. Transaction implies a 
negotiation between the individuals, an adaptation and 
coordination of individual wills developed within an 
institutional framework mutually interpreted and adapted 
by the parties. In line with this thinking, Williamson (1996) 
considers as a transaction the transfer of rights of using 
the goods and services between technologically separated 
units. As Menard (2000) states, transfer does not 
necessarily take into account the property rights, and 
thus, transaction does not refer only to the exchange on 
the free market. Transfer of assets between departments 
of the same organization or between entities linked by a 
franchise agreement represents, similar to the market, 
distinct ways of transactions. Therefore, the object of 
study of the economy of transaction costs, i.e. transaction, 
implies the study of the manner of organizing the resource 
transfer, briefly “how to organize” or “how to govern” 
(Williamson, 1996). In operational manner, Williamson 
(1996) points out the main characteristics of the 
transaction, such as distinctiveness of assets, uncertainty 
and frequency. Distinctiveness of assets is related to the 
opportunity cost, meaning that the lesser is the value of 
an asset in alternative usages to the current one, the 
more specific that assets will be. Uncertainty is related to 
behaviour, it refers to the partners’ actions and the ex-
ante and ex-post opportunism (adverse selection and 
moral hazard). The parties involved in transactions, 
entered in a two-sided dependence relationship, have the 
capacity to anticipate this dependence, to be aware of the 
contracts incompletion and to build appropriate 
organizational diagrams. Frequency can be unique, 
occasional or recurrent and it influences the 
organizational form picked up in correlation with the other 
two characteristics of transactions. In accordance with the 
definition boundaries and the transfer of the property 
rights, Ullrich (non-dated) classifies transactions as 
transactions made by exchange, contract transactions 
and transactions with externalities. The first category 
comprises the transfer of goods existing before concluding 
the contract, having clearly defined the property rights. 
The second category drives at goods resulted from a 
contract, after its concluding, and this category is 
characterized by a specific structure of ranging the 
property rights. The third category refers to the 
transactions affecting other persons beside the 
contracting parties, transactions where the transfer of 
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  i s  a b s e n t  o r ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  U l l r i c h ,  
cannot be accurately defined.  
There is no consensus on the concept of transaction, and 
no definition and unique listing for the transaction costs. 
Coase (1988) specifies these costs as those induced by 
the following activities: “to find out who you want to make 
transactions with, to inform the person that someone 
wants to make transactions and to render the terms of 
those transactions, to manage negotiations leading to 
understanding, to draw up the contract, to review in order 
to be sure that the contractual terms are observed, etc.”. 
According to Williamson (1996) the transaction costs are 
“the compared costs of planning, adjusting and tracking 
the transfer of rights associated to the duties within the 
alternative organizational settlements”. Grellet (1999) 
defines the transaction costs as “organizational and 
functional costs of the markets” to which there are added 
“the costs related to the compliance with the 
transactioned rights”. The organizational and functional 
costs of the markets refer to drawing-up and 
implementing the regulations regarding competition 
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assurance and compliance with the rule of law, but at the 
same time, the costs resulting from non-compliance with 
these regulations. The costs related to the compliance 
with the property rights sum up the costs resulted from 
the clear definition of the property rights (implicitly related 
to the rights of property unclearly defined) and the costs 
resulted from the creation and functioning of 
organizations and institutions which should guarantee the 
compliance with these rights. Precisely, from his point of 
view, the transaction costs comprise “direct costs of 
obtaining information concerning the exchange 
conditions, the negotiation costs, the costs related to 
compliance with the transactioned property rights, as well 
as indirect costs such as the losses incurred by non-
compliance with the clauses of contract or by the 
economic distortions created through contractual terms, 
fact generally called moral hazard. Menard (2004) 
separates in a different manner the direct transaction 
costs, linked to a particular transaction, from the indirect 
ones “resulted from the institutional framework required 
for the transaction to take place”. Thus, the direct 
transaction costs comprise the costs for searching 
partners, the costs for drawing up the contract and those 
related to securities, the monitoring cost, the cost induced 
by eventual dispute solving and the costs of contracts 
adjustment and renegotiation. The indirect costs refer to 
the market size, and more specifically, to the overall 
complexity of transactions on a certain market, to “the 
production of information on the characteristics of goods 
involved into the transaction” and to “the institutional 
framework required for a good transaction and for 
cheaters’ punishment”. Similarly, Musole (2009), with 
reference to Furubotn and Richter (2000), ranges the 
transaction costs in the following manner: market 
transaction costs, managerial transaction costs and 
political transaction costs. The first category is equivalent 
with Coase’s meaning, mentioned above, synthesized 
through the phrase “cost of using the price mechanism”. 
The second category includes “the costs for wielding the 
right to give orders into a firm”, particularly the costs for 
building, adjusting and ensuring the functioning of the 
organization. The third category refers to the costs for 
construction, adjustment and insurance of the political 
regime functioning (formal and informal).  
Transaction costs are in direct ratio to the uncertainty and 
the distinctiveness degree of assets and in inverse ratio to 
the transaction frequency (as repeated games lead to 
knowing the partners and mechanisms). The economy of 
transaction costs states that “the economic institutions in 
capitalism have as main purpose and result the 
transaction costs economy” (Williamson 1996). According 
to Williamson (1996), there are three alternative 
governance mechanisms: the market, the firm and the 
hybrid form. The criterion of choosing one of the three 
mechanisms is the one of the transaction costs economy. 
The market is the governance structure specialized in the 
exchange of property rights by voluntary agreement of the 
parties, ensuring the coordination of autonomous 
individual decisions through the mechanism of prices. An 
important feature of the markets from the view of 
transaction costs is that “the markets are organized”, 
meaning that they are “embedded into the institutions 
which shape them” and they can take various forms, in 
accordance with the “rules of the game” (Furubotn and 
Richter, 2000). The transactions through the market take 
the classical contractual shape, in which the property 
rights are clearly defined, the parties are independent, the 
parties’ identity is not relevant, and the settlement of 
e v e n t u a l  d i s p u t e s  i s  d o n e  b y  a p p e a l  t o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y ,  
generally a tribunal. The property rights being clearly 
defined, the parties’ excitement is high, given that the 
parties’ independence excludes the reciprocal 
administrative control. Beside the formal regulations, the 
market pressure, more exactly the existence of 
substitutes, reputation and trust contribute to the 
observance of the classical contract. Therefore, the 
contract adaptation through means of market is an 
autonomous one, done through the mechanism of prices 
and competition.  
Hierarchy, unlike market, is that governance structure 
where the allocation of resources is done through the 
agency of the authority, the firm being the best example. 
This one is based on an internal legal contract, where the 
parties, whose identity is important, are in a relationship 
of strong bilateral dependence stating that disputes 
should be settled inside the organization and not through 
intermediaries. Therefore, the excitement is decreased, 
the administrative control is high, and the adaptation is 
coordinated through administrative decisions.   
The hybrid, as its name suggests, is placed between the 
market and the firm, being less “free” than the market, 
and less “centralized” than the firm. It is governed by a 
“flexible” contract (called neoclassical), where the parties’ 
bilateral dependence is non-insignificant but the parties 
maintain their independence resulting in higher 
excitement than in the hierarchy case. This contractual 
form allows both an autonomous adaptation to minor 
disturbances and a coordinated one, justified by important 
disturbances. There can be considered hybrid forms all 
the forms of cooperation between firms in which they 
maintain their independence but they organize 
transactions through a unanimously accepted 
organizational design. Hereinafter, there shall be argued 
that rating agencies allow the transactions on the financial 
market under cover of the hybrid governance mechanism. 
2.2. Rating Agencies  
within the Structure of Financial Market 
The first credit ratings (1909) appeared after the panic in 
1907 in USA, which lead to the decrease of the investors’ 
trust into the financial market and its regulation manner, 
and the appearance of the need of impartial information, 
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supplied by neutral entities in respect of the debtors’ 
financial reliability. At present, the international rating 
market is like an “oligopoly with fringes” represented by 
three big firms, Moody’s, Standard&Poor’s (owned by 
McGraw-Hill Inc.) and Fitch (owned by FIMALAC, France), 
and other small specialized firms without power on the 
market. Up to the beginning of the 7th decade of last 
century, the incomes of the rating agencies were coming 
from the sale of financial reports to the subscribers. After 
the ’70s the situation changed radically, in the sense that 
the incomes came mainly from commissions, which 
represent several percentage points from the value of the 
evaluated issuance, supported by the issuer (Levich, 
Majnoni and Reinhart, 2002).  
Briefly, the risk grade attached to a corporation, a country, 
a project or a security emphasizes two aspects: the risk to 
cease payments and the recovery prospects (Fitchratings, 
2009). Though rating agencies state that rating is only an 
opinion, many authors give bigger importance to rating by 
saying that it is “the archetype of a new institutional 
coordinating configuration developed within the conditions 
of financial globalization” (Sinclair, 2005).  
Which is the role of rating agencies on the international 
financial markets? In accordance to the financial market 
theory, the prices on this market show the entire 
information publicly available, but they do not incorporate 
the private one, in other words, the real market is efficient 
in a semi-powerful configuration (Fama, 1991). This 
market failure determines the need of certain signals to 
allow the classification of debt instruments and debtors in 
accordance with quality (balance of division). Rating 
agencies have human, technical and informational 
resources specific to information collecting and 
processing in order to assess the debtors’ degree of trust 
(Tang, 2009). These ones have a more “special” 
relationship with the issuer of securities, given their 
access to private information, which other participants to 
the financial market do not have access to, increasing the 
trust into rating. The place of rating agencies within the 
corporate governance system can be briefly described as 
it follows (Figure 1). 
The Figure 1 shows the structure of the corporate 
governance system, pointing out the division between 
owners and surveyors, emphasizing the linking role of 
monitors between the two executive structures. Moody's 
(2008) asserts that the rating agencies main and 
appropriate role is that of facilitating transparency and 
efficiency of the capital markets, by reducing the 
informational asymmetry between issuers and investors. 
In this way, the market gains itself due to the fact that the 
investors’ trust increases and the issuers have access to 
more funds. The previous assertion, derived from the 
theory principal-agent, is supported by Duff and Einig 
(2009) who, through a survey based on a questionnaire, 
conducted on the financial market in Great Britain, prove 
that the main source of rating demand is the decrease of 
agency conflicts between the issuers (agents) and 
investors (principals). The same study proves that issuers 
appeal to rating to diminish the informational asymmetry 
and, thus, the loan cost, and it also proves that “rating 
decreases the problems concerning the adverse selection, 
making the title more attractive for a larger group of 
investors”. In addition, rating agencies function as a 
mechanism of monitoring the debt up to maturity by the 
periodical review of the initial rating, limiting thus, the 
manifestation of debtors’ moral hazard. The place of 
rating agencies within financial intermediation can be 
briefly described as it follows (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. The corporate governance system 
 
Source: Nofsinger 2004: 6 
 
 
Figure 2. The place of rating agencies within financial 
intermediation through the market 
 
Source: adaptation after Collin, Sven-Olof, Financial intermediation 
through markets and organisations: an information-boundary 
argument for financial organizations, 1997:178 
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The regulating authorities on the financial market have 
granted another important role to rating agencies. Thus, 
many regulations regarding the capital adequacy to credit 
institutions and the portfolios of investment funds depend 
on rating. Therefore, Partnoy (2006) associates a 
regulation value to rating which explains their exponential 
development after the ’70s. The professional literature 
sums up the main functions of rating: the information 
function, the function of catalyst of transactions, the 
monitoring function, the standardization function (as it is a 
reference) and the regulating one.  
The economy of transaction costs offers a new 
perspective on the place of rating agencies within the 
financial market structure, completing the principal-agent 
theory and referring to the regulating character of rating. 
Thus, the main funding sources available to potential 
debtors are the financial market (by issuance of credit 
instruments) and different categories of financial 
intermediaries, owners of money availabilities (mainly 
credit institutions). The decision to place the financial 
r e s o u r c e s  a s  d e b t  i s  a  d i f f i c u l t  o n e ,  b o t h  d u e  t o  t h e  
informational asymmetry between debtor and creditor and 
due to the uncertainty regarding the future situation of the 
business environment. In other words, the credit contract 
is affected by two types of uncertainty: one related to the 
behavior (Williamson’s meaning, referring to what the 
other people will do) and one external to the relationship 
itself between partners. Diatkine (1993) states that we 
can distinguish two forms of uncertainty on the financial 
market: a structured uncertainty, reducible to risk, if the 
probabilities of future events could be associated, and a 
non-structured uncertainty if not. Reducing the uncertainty 
to risk allows concluding complete contracts, so that the 
most efficient funding could be the one through the 
market. The non-structured uncertainty determines the 
incomplete character of contracts, so that “the lack of 
initial knowledge must be compensated by a process of 
learning through a continuous adaptation of contracts and 
an adjusting mechanism” (Diatkine, 1993). The credit 
given by the financial intermediaries and financing from 
internal resources are preferable to the market because 
they assure the ex-post monitoring and the coordination of 
the adjustment mechanism functioning.  
In this context, there can be defined three main types of 
organizing the financial transactions: the market, the 
hybrid forms and the hierarchy (internal financing). Rating 
agencies are linked to the hybrid forms, which are 
generally complex contractual structures. A clear hybrid 
form is the governance of the relationship of running into 
debt through the credit contract. The financial 
intermediaries have the human, informational and 
technological resources required to the initial assessment 
of debtors and they also have monitoring and facilitating 
mechanisms of the ex-post adaptation. The investors on 
the financial market do not have such resources or they 
can think that accessing them is too expensive, leaving 
way thus, to the rating agencies. Through the rating-
synthesized information, agencies have allowed the 
adaptation of market transactions to the non-structured 
uncertainty, and thus there could be introduced a new 
hybrid governance form of financial transactions: a 
contract between the financial investor and the debtor 
mediated by the rating agency. It is possible for this hybrid 
governance form to be characterized by higher excitement 
than the one within a credit relationship, due to higher 
transparency and price fluctuation of the debt instruments 
on the market, but this assumption must be empirically 
tested. Administrative control is closer to the market, 
quasi-zero, lesser than the other governance forms, given 
t h a t  ra t i n g  i s  o n l y  a n  o p i ni o n ,  a n d  t h e  a ge n c i e s  d o  n o t 
interfere in internal decisions. This type of hybrid 
governance allows both an autonomous adaptation, 
through the mechanism of prices, and a coordinated one, 
by the flexible contract related to rating. 
3. DO RATING AGENCIES  
SAVE THE TRANSACTION COSTS? 
The transactions made by rating agencies are included in 
two non-detachable categories from empirical point of 
view: contractual transactions and transactions with 
externalities. Transactions embody an incomplete 
contract, due to the fact that they refer to the transfer of 
certain property rights on rating, a good ex-post result. The 
same transactions involve also externalities, due to the 
fact that the transacted good itself - synthetic information 
regarding the credit quality – is controversial, and rating is 
disseminated on the financial market and influences the 
allocation of financial resources. The external effects are 
intended to be positive: increase of market transparency, 
wider access to information assured for small investors, 
favourable legal treatment for those who invest in assets 
rated as good quality assets, and therefore, diminution of 
the costs involved into risk management. But rating is 
mainly developed “beyond cycle” and not “point-in-time”, 
that is why the crisis periods alter the information 
incorporated by rating, leading to reversing external 
effects. Externalities, positive or negative, by their nature 
cannot be internalized as they ultimately result from the 
investors’ trust in ratings and from legal requirements.  
The frequency of contractual transactions on rating 
market is recurrent, encouraging thus the construction of 
a certain governance structure of the transactions with 
ratings. Rating distinctiveness degree (assets 
distinctiveness) is in direct ratio to the complexity of the 
assessed financial instruments. Associated to frequency, 
distinctiveness determines the two-sided dependence 
between the agency and issuer so that, the identification 
of parties is relevant and the continuation of contract 
brings value. Therefore, the relationship between the 
rating agency and issuer can be considered a hybrid form: 
a long term “flexible” contract (justification doctrine), 
allowing the mutual adaptation of the parties to important 
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disturbances inside a definite margin of tolerance. The 
fact that there is a hybrid organizational mechanism, and 
the market is not the one governing the transactions, is 
empirically supported by a certain conflict of interests 
determined by the regulating authorities on the occasion 
of the recent financial crisis. In other words, it is the rating 
agencies experts’ involvement into the manner of creating 
the structured instruments which should have been 
assessed before displayed on the financial market. The 
experts’ recommendations were leading to better ratings 
of the structured titles, which were not reflecting correctly 
their risk, fact proved later on by the financial crisis. More 
exactly, rating agencies and issuers have used their 
common informational and human resources to obtain 
additional gains from the sale of structured titles, this 
being the equivalent to a kind of hybrid governance form. 
The hybrid form of governance on the rating market 
presumes a relationship agency–issuer mediated by the 
regulating authorities.  
Due to the externalities generated by the transactions with 
rating, the regulating authorities intercede with the often 
non-formal relationship rating agencies–investors, by 
requirements of allocating the financial resources 
depending on rating. These externalities are the ones 
allowing the motivation of rating agencies existence by 
their capacity to reduce the transaction costs. A common 
survey of Treasury and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (2008) stated in fact that rating 
agencies “reduce complexity in the financial system and 
reduce transaction costs associated with financial 
dealings”.  
Issuers require ratings in order to point out their quality 
and thus, to benefit of certain conditions of access to 
funding. Through rating, issuers communicate to the 
market “who they want to make transactions with”, what 
the conditions are, and further to obtaining financing, the 
degree of contractual compliance of their conduct. On the 
other hand, rating helps investors in selecting debtors, 
diminishing the search and selection costs of the 
investment alternatives. In addition, rating acts as a 
monitoring mechanism of the debt till its maturity. It is up-
dated by the rating agency every time important events 
require this and it is revised at least annually. Rating 
decay is a signal for the depreciation of the issuer’s 
economic situation and allows investors to activate 
defence measures. In addition, managers are pushed to 
develop a conduct leading to maintenance or 
improvement of the risk grade so that there could be 
argued that rating acts on them like a mechanism of 
control and excitement. Therefore, there are three 
categories of direct transaction costs, whose economy is 
allowed by the existence of rating agencies: costs for 
searching partners, security costs and monitoring costs. 
Due to the fact that specific financing conditions are 
associated to specific ratings (into a certain fluctuation 
line), there can be said that rating allows the diminution of 
time and resources spending for the negotiation of the 
financing contracts and the decrease of costs of financial 
resources, fact implying other direct transaction costs.   
With reference to what Menard (2000) called indirect 
transaction costs, rating acts as a “device” which 
“speeds” the meeting of debtors and creditors and 
reduces the limitations at the market entrance (entrance 
costs). At the same time, rating diminishes the 
information production costs on the quality of debt 
instruments, and the regulations depending on rating 
affect the functioning cost of the capital market 
institutions and determine the diminution of the cost of 
meeting legal requirements. Therefore, by reducing the 
transaction costs, rating influences the development of 
the financial market and the growth of the complexity of 
transactional instruments. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Failure of rating agencies in assuring the rating accuracy 
within periods with high volatility and the assumption 
sustained by empirical surveys that the market succeeds 
in signalling faster than ratings the future payment 
difficulties have raised questions regarding the reason of 
the rating agencies existence. The objective of this paper 
was to sustain the assertion that rating agencies are the 
intermediary on the capital market determining by their 
ratings the transaction cost diminution on this market. In 
order to achieve this objective, in the first part of the 
paper there was considered the placement of rating 
agencies within the theoretical framework given by the 
economy of transaction costs. The main conclusions of 
this part are the following:  
•  the transactions with rating between the rating 
agencies and issuers or/and between them and 
rating buyers take the hybrid form; the hybrid form 
of governance characterizing rating suppose an 
agency-issuer relationship mediated by the 
regulation authorities;  
•  the transactions with rating have generated an 
important externality: they have led to a new hybrid 
governance of the financial transactions, i.e. a 
contract between the financial investor and debtor 
mediated by the rating agency.  
This new structure of governance determines the 
reduction of the following transaction costs related to the 
financial market:  
•  the costs for searching and selecting partners;   
•  the costs of the negotiation of financing contracts;  
•  the costs of the financial resources gained from the 
market; 
•  the costs of guarantee and monitoring; 
•  the costs of entering the financial market; 
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•  the costs of the information production on the 
quality of debt instruments; 
•  the cost of meeting legal requirements; 
•  generally, the cost of operating the capital market 
institutions. 
Therefore, there can be said that saving the transaction 
costs is an important determiner of the rating agencies 
existence, development and survival, beyond the world 
economic crises. However, additional studies are required 
to attest this statement and to measure the value of 
transaction costs saved by the presence of rating 
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